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ABSTRACT 
Title of Thesis: Problems Raised by Technological Advances 
on Copyright in Musical Compositions 
Philip C. Geraci, Master of Arts, 1961 
Thesis directed by: Guy B. Hathorn, Associate Professor 
This thesis attempts to point out a nwnber of laoks in the present 
Copyright Act which exist because of recent advances in electronic 
technology. Specifically, it attempts to indicate the enormous growth 
of electronic entertainment for the home, and to show how this new fonn 
of entertainment poses problems concerning copyright which never have 
existed before. 
Since very few cases are on record which deal with the use of recorded 
music at home, it has been necessary to examine cases which deal with 
copyright and music in general terms and to draw analogies to adapt 
existing precedent to new situations. It is pointed out in some detail 
that the Copyright Act of 1909, still in effect today, does not treat 
present conditions as explicitly as might be liked, and results in con-
siderable confusion where non- co1nmercial and non-profitable use of 
recorded music is concerned. 
The subject is of vital interest to copyright attorneys, manufacturers 
of recordings and recording equipment, performing rights societies, 
artists, and amateur hobbyists since no thorough analysis of problems 
raised by home recording has ever been made. The handful of acknowledged 
authorities on the subject have only a personal opinion on the outcome of 
any hypothetical case dealing with home recording. 
Whether or not a home recordist violates the Copyright statute when 
he records music from a radio has never been officially determined. It 
is the intent of this paper to analyze the Copyright Act and its judicial 
and practical application and show how. by several lines of reasoning. 
home recording does not infringe. 
The thesis is divided into chapters which deal with the growth of 
modern technology. the present Copyright Act. performing rights societies 
and judicial interpretation. Finally. a concluding chapter offers a 
solution to the mounting problem of home recording as it could be treated 
in a general revision of the Copyright Act. 
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A. A Technological Revolution 
Since 1900 the world has undergone the greatest technological 
revolution in its history. The list of mechanical, chemical or electrical 
devices whioh have been aimed at making work easier, quicker or more 
efficient is quite lengthy. In the first six decades of the twentieth 
century civilization has seen the emergence or practical development of 
aviation, electronics, electricity, motion pictures and a vast number of 
conveniences designed for bet ter living. 
But of t he many f orms of technology which have been developed since 
the turn of the century, electronics has been one of the fastest growing. 
In some measure, our lives are affected daily by some application of 
eleotronics. Subsistence, entertainment, protection, transportation: all 
are aided in some fashion by electronics. In terms of finance, electronics 
has grown at a more rapid rate than any other single industrial endeavor. 
Factory sales of electronic products in 1914 amounted to roughly $1 million. 
By 1959 the figure had topped $10 billion.1 
But growth in electronics has not been without pitfalls -- many of 
a legal nature. From Marconi's early experiments to stereophonic broad-
casting, recently announced, legal arguments over ownership rights to 
patents and copyrights have flourished. But whereas legal guides to 
patent ownership have been fairly wel l defined, some rat her confusing 
questions remain over the exact legal definition of "literary rights" in 
1Electronic Industries Association, 1960 Fact Book (Washington: 
Electronic Industries Association, 1960), p. 9. 
1 
2 
musical composit ions and the degree to which they ar e enti tl ed to protec-
tion from non-commercial exploitation. 
B. The Matter of Infringement 
Roger Needham, a University of Michigan Law School student, prefaced 
his award-winning entry in the Burkan Memorial Essay Competiti on thus: 
Today, with the marketing of inexpensive tape recorders and photocopy 
machines, it must appear to those concerned wi t h protecting copyrights 
that 'do-it-2ourself' home copyright infringement ki ts are availabl e to everyone. 
Mr. Needham's words would imply that the problem of invasion of ri ghts 
in musical compositions is current. But it is not new. Thirty-seven 
years ago Judge Mack reoognized the new legal problems brought on by 
electronio development: 
While the fact that radio was not developed at t he time the 
Copyright Act ••• was enacted may raise some question as to 
whether it properly comes within the purview of the statute, 
it is not by that fact alone excluded from the statute. In 
other words, the statute may be applied to new situat ions not 
anticipated by Congress, i~ fairly construed, such situations 
come within its intent and meaning. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
While statutes should not be stretched to apply to new situati ons 
not fairly within their scope, they should not be so narrowly con-
strued as to pennit their evasion because of changing habits due 
to new inventions and discoveries.3 
c. Development of Music at Home 
It has been the growth of radio, perhaps more than any other techno-
logioal development in the field of home entertainment, which has raised 
the greatest number of legal problems. As performing rights societies 
2Roger Needham, "Tape Recording, Photocopying, and Fair Use," 
Copyright Law Symposium, Number Ten (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959}, p. 75. 
3Remick v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (1925). 
3 
were being organized to protect the composer from unfair use of his music, 
it was found tha.t the greatest threat to uncompensated "pirating" of music 
was the broadcast medium. A number of cases -- most of them cited yet 
today -- arose because "free" music which was broadcast was put to 
commercial use without payment of royalty fees. 
It was exactly this sort of activity which prompted Judge' Mack's 
admonishment of 1925. By that date radio broadcasting was still in its 
infancy. Stations 1CDKA, Pittsburgh,. and WWJ, Detroit, had been on the air 
barely five years. The National Broadcasting Company did not begin net-
work broadcasting for another year. Regular broadcasts of symphonic music 
and opera did not occur for another ten years. Even as a communications 
medium, radio by 1926 was just thirty-seven years old. It was in 1898 that 
Guglielmo Marconi took out his first patents (later contested) in England. 4 
Along with the airplane and the automobile, radio developed slowly 
but steadily in the first four decades of the twentieth century. Then 
came World War II, forcing rapid technological expansion to meet the needs 
of modern warfare. During the war electronics advanced at an unprecedented 
rate. As soon as possible after the war's conclusion, military developments 
were turned to consumer purposes. The result was a mass infusion of new 
instruments television, tape recorders, home sound movies, long playing 
records, high fidelity (and now stereo) and a host of others -- into the 
American culture. 
Figures compiled by the Federal Communications Commission illustrate 
the tremendous growth which has taken place in the broadcast industry 
\ionroe Upton, Electronics for Everyone (New York: The Devin-
Adair Co., 1959), P• 105. 
4 
since World War II. In 1946 the number of licensed AM broadcast stations 
in the United States was 1,066. By 1950 the number had grown to 2,232. 
Nine years later the figure was 3,450. 5 Many applications for new licenses 
are still pending. It is likely that the figures will continue to rise. 
On the consumer level, interest in radio and in other instruments 
designed for home musical entertainment has shown a similar rise over the 
past fifteen years. Radio production prior to World War II was 11,831,000 
units, representing a dollar volume of more than $176,000,000. By 1947, 
in the first rush of post-war manufacturing, production climbed to 20,000,000 
units, valued at $650,000,000. 6 
Other forms of broadcasting also were on the rise. Television developed 
quickly after the war. In 1946 only six TV stations were operating. By 
1969 the total was 670. FM radio was developed prior to the war but did 
not get its real start until afterwards. In 1946 there were forty-eight 
FM stations in operation in the U.S. Three ye&rs later the total was 
750. 7 
Another form. of home musical entertainment -- record playing -- rose 
in popularity after the war to become one of the nation's leading industries. 
Factory sales of phonograph records in 1940 were $48 million. By 1946 
the total had risen to $99 million. Ten years later, after a gradual 
ascendency to $236 million, record sales took a sudden spurt upward. By 
1959 the total was $462 million. 8 
6Electronic Industries Association, £E_• cit., p. 21. 
6Ibid., P• 14. 
7~. , p. 21. 
8~., P• 19. 
The rise in electronic technology and the vast increase in sales of 
devices designed for home entertainment signified a new trend in the 
pattern of American culture. Whereas motion pictures had dominated the 
entertainment scene during and in the years immediately following World 
War II, the trend during the fiftieB was toward entertainment ,vi thin the 
ho1llo itself. A great deal or credit for this pattern can be ascribed to 
television, which made perhaps the greatest impression. But the figures 
showing the great rise in sales of phonograph records over the past five 
years indicates that a segment of the American public, at least, is 
turning to "canned" music for its entertainment. 
5 
Whereas most music composed in the twenties and thirties was intended 
for presentation from the stage, by live musicians, composers in the fifties 
looked to record sales for a large part of their profit. Jukeboxes, radio, 
TV, motion pictures and records reach a vast audience mu.oh larger than the 
crowds an artist (or composer) can reach in person. 
D. Law and Technology 
The shift from public to private enjoyment of music has been due, 
of course. to teohnological advancements in electronics which have made 
the equipment for private listening available. But, just as problems due 
to commercial use of broadcast music arose in the twenties, problems 
regarding private, or non-commercial, use of broadcast music have arisen 
in recent years. The problems have grown almost in direct proportion to 
the upsurge in record and equipment sales. Tape recorders have been used 
to capture broadcast musical performances for later use. and it is primarily 
because or the tape recorder that the legal problems discussed in this 
paper have arisen. Although there is little doubt regarding the use of 
recorded music for profitable purposes, much doubt exists as to the 
lengths to which a home recordist may go in preserving and performing 
music he has recorded on tape. 
As the technology advances, new problems will continue to arise. 
6 
In recent years home movies have acquired a capacity for sound. Amateur 
photographers owning such equipment will want to add narration and musical 
background. The films will be shown to friends. To what extent is such 
an activity to be deemed "fair use" of a copyrighted composition? 
Television recorders have appeared on the commercial market and in-
dications are that ultimately a "home" version will be developed. Equipment 
for preserving TV programs will raise new questions over the legality of 
their use. 
In the United States., the foremost performing rights society -- ASCAP 
overlooked a lucrative source of revenue in the public demonstration of 
high fidelity equipment with copyrighted music. Instead, ASCAP sought to 
plug a hole in the Copyright Law which permits jukebox operators an 
exemption from royalty payments. Nearly ten years of Congressional 
hearings have failed to provide either the attempted revision or a com-
promise solution. 
The pirating of commer cial records by "fly-by-night" independent 
record producers has reached substantial proportions. 9 By 1961 a bill 
had reached the Senate Judiciary Committee to make such practices criminal 
offenses. Thus far no criminal penalties have been provided. 
Moves to increase protection for musical composers are being made in 
countries outside the U.S. In Germany, legislation to license tape 
9wall Street Journal (New York)., April 20, 1961., p. 1. 
recorder owners is being considered. A recant decision there requires 
manufacturers to warn purchasers of the potential dangers of copyright 
infringement. 10 
7 
The advance of technology has had its share of legal problems on the 
commercial scene, as well. Television programs previously were available 
only on film (if not presented "live" ) and were copyrightable as motion 
pictures. Recently the Copyright Office ruled that "video taped" TV 
programs also would be entitled to copyright, since the image they produce 
is visual (as in a motion picture) rather than audible, as in a record. 
The action was taken arbitrarily, despite an earlier, and still valid, 
ruling that records cannot themselves be copyrighted, since they are not 
"copies" in the legal sense. 11 
The deolaration may, however, be simply a stop-gap move to pave the 
way for a thorough analysis of the Copyright Law, now past its fiftieth 
year of existenoe. The revision studies were begun in 1956. To date more 
than thirty-four repor·l:;s have been prepared f'or the Senate Judiciary 
Committee's Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights.12 
But revision of the Copyright Law will not be an easy task. The com-
plications of advancing technology are great. The 1909 Law was five years 
in preparation, and conditions were not nearly so complex as they are today. 
lOThe case was GEMA v. Grundig, decided in 1960. 
llRegulations of the Copyright Office, Section 202.S(b). The 
regulation is baaed on Miite-Smith v. Apol lo, 209 U.S. 1, (1908). Infor-
mation on copyrightabili ty of video taped programs is based on an interview 
with the chief of the reference division of the Library of Congress. 
12copyrlght Office, Library of Congress: Co!yright Law Revision 
Studies (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961. 
8 
Until firm answers to many questions of copyright validity and 
infringement are forthcoming, confusion will continue to dictate the 
actions of many individuals who deal with music, electronic entertainment 
and law. Delay will simply serve to postpone a solution to problems which 
are increasing with continued sales of electronic devices to the public. 
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the Copyright Law as it has 
been applied since 1909 and to view its present provisions in the light of 
recent developments in radio and music. Actions dealing with copyright 
and music will be considered, and conclusions will be drawn regarding the 
degree to which the Copyright Law can be applied to non-commercial uses 
of recorded music. 
CH.APTER II 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND MUSIC 
A. Early Protection for Composers 
Many difficulties arising from interpretation of copyright law are 
due to the lack of foresight shown by legislators in 1909 when the present 
Copyright Act was drafted. Phonograph records were referred to in those 
days as "mechanical reproductions." Radio was not mentioned at all. 
Copyright protection for composers of music in the United States 
dates from 1831. Originally it was intended to apply to live performances, 
in theaters, restaurants and carnivals. 
In the .American colonies a need for protection of literary property 
was recognized by framers of the Constitution who wrote: 
The Congress shall have power ••• to promote the progress of science 
and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis-
coveries ••• to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers •••• 1 
The first copyright statute in America had been written well in 
advance of the Constitutional Convention. A carryover from England, it 
was the "Act of Queen Anne," established in 1709. 2 The opening words were 
as follows: 
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late fre-
quently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing 
books without the consent of the authors or proprietors ••• to their 
very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their 
families, for preventing therefore such practices for the future, 
and for the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful 
3 books •••• 
lu.s. Constitution, Art. I, 88. 
2Margaret Nicholson, A Manual of Copyright Practice (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 3. 
3 ~•, P• 3. 
9 
10 
The l aw granted an author exolusive rights for f ourteen years , and 
provided a fourteen-year renewal period. Damages for infri ngement were 
one penny for every sheet of every book printed illegally. 
Protection for composers' rights oame earlier in Europe than in the 
U.S. Denmark enacted a copyright law in 1741. France followed in 1793 
with a law which was passed on to Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and Hol land 
as each came under the influence of Napoleon. Spain received a copyright 
l aw in 1847. In 1887 the Berne Convention resulted i n the Internat ional 
Copyright Union, to which all important European nations became signatories . 4 
In the American colonies, copyright laws were adopted i n Maryland, 
Massachusetts and Connecticut in 1783, and later in New Jersey, New 
Hampshire and Rhode Island. Ultimately all but Delaware had some sort of 
legislation. Difficulties of administering state copyright laws were fore-
seen, and Constitution architects provided, in Section 8, Article I, 
authority for Congress to enact a copyright law. 5 
The first federal copyright act was passed in 1790. It covered "books, 
maps and charts" but did little to prevent pirating of foreign books by 
United States publishers. A number of amendments followed over the next 
century, including one in 1831 which added music to the list of copyrightable 
material. Protection was extended from fourteen to twenty-eight years. 
A series of amendments began in 1856. Dramatists were granted per-
formance rights in 1856. Protection was extended to photographs in 1866. 
Another general act, passed in 1870, placed copyright matters under t he 
Librarian of Congress. A Register of Copyrights was provided in 1897, while 
4:rbid., pp. 4-6. 
6Eugene Mooney, "The Jukebox Exemption," Cop~right Law Symposium 
Number Ten {New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 197. 
11 
performance rights granted in 1856 to dramatists were extended to 
musio. 6 
B. The Present Copyright Law 
The present law was enacted in 1909, after five years of deliberation. 
The passage pertaining to music is Section l(e) which reads, in part, as 
follows: 
work: 
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of 
this title, shall have the exclusive right: 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a 
musical composition; and for the purpose of public performance for 
profit ••• to make an.y arrangement or setting of it or of the 
melody ••• in any system of notation or any form of record in which 
the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be 
read or reproduced •••• 7 
Section 2 established the rights of an author of an unpublished 
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right 
of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or 
in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such un-
published work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor.8 
The law establishes different conditions for copyrighted and unpublished 
music. The owner of an unpublished work can claim damages for all "copying, 
publication or use" of his composition. This protection is indefinite in 
length. It is not bound by the two twenty-eight year terms of protection 
provided for works which are registered. Claim oan be handed from 
generation to generation, so long as the music remains unpublished, whereas 
a copyrighted piece of music oe.n be protected for a maximum of fifty-six 
years. 
6.,Nicholson, 2i.• .£!!•• P• 7. 
717 u.s.c. ll(e). 
817 U .s .c. !2. 
12 
It may seem odd that the Copyright Office denies protection for 
phonograph records. The reasoning dates back to the turn of the century 
when phonograph records as we know them today did not exist. Player 
pianos equipped with music rolls were much in style. Makers of piano 
rolls did not pay royalties for the music they provided and eventually an 
action was brought, in White-Smith v. Apollo, for copyright infringement. 9 
When the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether the manufac-
ture and sale of music rolls constituted an infringement of a copyrighted 
musical composition it ruled that it did not because the music rolls were 
not copies and their distribution did not constitute publication. By way 
of dictum, the Court stated that it is only "copies" which are entitled to 
protection, and went on to state that "mechanical devices" such as piano 
rolls and phonograph records are not "copies" within the meaning of the Act. 
The Regulations of the Copyright Office maintain this philosophy today, 
by stating: 
A phonograph or other sound recording is not considered a "oopy" of 
the compositions recorded on it, and is not acceptable for copyright 
registration. Likewise, the Copyright Office does not register 
claims to exclusive rights in mechanical recordings themselves, or 
in the performances they reproduce. 10 
An individual C8llnot refuse to copyright a musical composition. in 
order to retain the benefits of common-law rights, and still permit records 
to be made and distributed. It was held in the Miracle Records casell 
that if a musical composition is recorded and distributed without the owner 
conforming to the formalities of copyright registration his rights to the 
9209 U.S. l (1908). 
lORegulations of the Copyright Office, Section 202.S(b). 
1191 F. Supp. 473. 
composition are lost by default. The work then reverts to the public 
domain. A significant fact thus was established as a part of the law: 
that sale and dissemination of records constitutes publication. 
13 
Section 10 of the Copyright Act delineates the method of securing 
copyright by publication and filing with the Copyright Office, while 
Section 13 outlines the regulations governing deposit of copies following 
publication. Penalties for failure to deposit copies are enumerated in 
Seotion 14. Renewals are discussed in Section 26, and "date of publica-
tion" in Section 2s. 12 
Chapter 2 of the Copyright Act, dealing with infringement, specifies 
damages for improper use of "mechanical reproductions of musical works." 
The Act states: 
Whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used or pe:nnitted the 
use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of musical instruments 
serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, then in case of 
infringement of such copyright by the unauthorized manufacture, use, 
or sale of interchangeable parts, such as disks, rolls, bands, or 
cylinders for use in mechanical music-producing machines ••• no 
criminal action shall be brought, but in a civil action an in1unotion may be granted upon such terms as the court may impose •••• 3 
Then follows the famous "compulsory provision" of the Act, which 
stipulates that a composer who has penn.itted his music to be recorded by 
one manufacturer oannot prevent another from recording the work~ so long 
as manufacturer number two files the proper forms and pays a royalty of 
"2 cents on each such part manufactured." 
The statutory damages allowed for copyright infringement are stated 
as follows: 
1217 u.s.c. I 10, 13, 14, 25, 26. 
1317 u.s.c. B lOl(e). 
14 
In the case of a dramatic or dramatico--musical or a choral or 
orchestral composition. $100 f or the first and $50 for every subse-
quent infringing performance; in the case of other musical composi-
tions $10 for every infringing performance.14 
Criminal provisions are discussed in Section 104 which makes willful 
infringement for profit a misdemeanor for which "conviction thereof shall 
be punished by imprisonment not exceeding one year or by a fine of not 
less than $100 nor more than 1.000. or both. «15 . . 
The Act places limitations on works entitled to copyright. Protection 
cannot be afforded mechanical reproductions of music published or copy-
righted prior to July 1. 1909; to compositions of a foreign composer unless 
the nation of which he is a citizen grants equivalent protection to U.S. 
citizens; or to music performed on a jukebox unless a fee is charged for 
admission to the place where the performance occurs. If the copyright 
o'Wller permits records to be made and fails to file the statutory notice 
that he has permitted such use failure to do so will be a complete defense 
16 
to anyone else recording the work. 
It might be pointed out that in practice it is to the financial 
advantage of a composer to secure copyright by publishing his work on 
records as soon as possible. since the two-cent fee required by statute 
is usually greater than the contract fee established with the record manu-
facturer who processes the discs initially. Although rates vary. it is 
not uncommon for the contract fee to amount to considerably less than half 
1411 u.s.c. I lOl(b). 
1517 u.s.c. I 104. 
1617 u.s.c. I l(e). 
15 
the statutory minimum. This fee is further divided equally between the 
composer and publisher. A composer may wind up with less than half a 
17 cent per record. 
c. Revision of the Copyright Act 
Although other sections of the Copyright Act apply to music in 
general terms, the foregoing are the provisions which are chiefly con-
cerned with musio per se. The language of the Act leaves little doubt 
that modern technology was unforeseen in 1909. Even the few amendments 
which have been made over the fifty-two years of the Act's existence have 
done little to align it with advancing technology. 
Many copyright authorities view stop-gap amendments with little favor. 
For example, many attempts have been made over the past ten years to amend 
the "jukebox exemption" but none have been successful. Legislative 
witnesses to the 1959 subcommittee hearings conceded that very probably 
ASC.AP and the jukebox operators in business today never would be able to 
reach agreement. Most authorities feel that, ultimately, the small 
operators will succumb to economic pressures. When the field has narrowed 
to a handful of large associations, the cry that license payments to 
ASCAP would be an impossible strain no longer will be valid. Agreement 
on changes to the exemption then may be possible. 
On the other hand, the Copyright Act may have received a general 
revision by then, and the problem may no longer exist. Congress voted 
funds for a survey of the Act in 1954, and the first of thirty-four studies 
17u.s. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5921, 
To Re uire Jukebox erators to Pa Ro al Fees, 86th Cong., 1st. Sess. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969, p. 99. 
16 
was printed by the Government Printing Office in 1955. Dealing with many 
facets of the copyright situation, the studies have been published since 
1955 as they have been completed. 
Al though most of the studies deal with the situation either in 
general terms or cover written works other than music, a few studies are 
directly concerned with musical copyright. Study No. 5, by Harry G. Henn, 
examines the compulsory license provisions of the Act; Study No. 6, by 
W. M. Blaisdell, investigates economic aspects of the compulsory pro-
visions; while Study No. 26 covers unauthorized duplication (pirating) of 
sound recordings.18 
Within a few years the Copyright Office probably will offer Congress 
a new Copyright Act. Undoubtedly, committee hearings will consume a con-
siderable amount of time before definite action, if any, is forthcoming. 
Satisfying divergent interests in our present complex society will not be 
easy. Conceivably, a new Act never will materialize. Perhaps the courts 
will be called upon to settle the issues indefinitely. Many authorities 
would prefer to see this alternative, feeling it offers a less violent 
solution than general revision of the Act. 
But whatever the method, answers to many copyright questions are 
urgently needed. Technology is becoming increasingly complex. Indications 
point to even greater complexity aa the years advance. If confusion is 
not met by determination, it will continue to rise. Worst of all, it 
could result in a partial collapse of the present system of copyright 
protection. 
18All thirty-four studies are available from the Government 
Printing Office. 
CHAPTER III 
PRACTICAL COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 
A. ASCAP 
As a practical matter it would be virtually impossible f'or individual 
composers to ferret out each and every infringement of their music. Al-
though an action to recover f'or infringement normally is brought in the 
name of the composer, there exist in this country three associations 
which assist their composer members by serving as agents not only to 
guard against infringement but to pass on royalties collected through 
their vast licensing networks. 
Such organizations are known as performing rights societies, and 
although there are numerous small societies with limited membership, most 
music written in the United States is licensed by one of the three which 
have come to be the most powerful. Foremost in size of membership and 
annual income is ASCAP -- the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers. ASCAP was fanned less than four years after the present 
Copyright Law was enacted. 
Smaller in membership but equally vigorous in its attitude is BMI 
Broadcast Music, Inc. -- which was formed by broadcasters in the early 
forties in defiance of ASCAP's music monopoly. The third society of im-
portance is SESAC, Inc. -- formerly the Society of European Stage Authora 
and Composers. 
The purposes for which ASCAP was formed, at Luchow's restaurant in 
New York City on a rainy night in October, 1913, were well stated by 
Nathan Burkan, one of ASCAP's nine original founders and the Society's 
first attorney: 
Prior to 1914 it was the universal practice throughout the United 
States on the part of' proprietors of places of public resort 
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operated for profit ••• to perform publicly for profit duly copy-
righted musical works without the let, leave or license of the 
composers and authors ••• of such works • ••• 
Throughout the length and breadth of the nation, in nearly 
every hotel, restaurant, motion picture theater, vaudeville theater, 
cabaret, dance hall and other place of public amusement, the most 
successful works of .American authors were seized and appropriated 
and publicly performed for the profit of the proprietor ••• in 
violation of the copyrights of the author of such work •••• 
The illegality of such performances was extremely difficult to 
establish and prove unless a trustworthy and responsible person 
located in the vicinage where such illegal perfonnance took place 
was on hand to witness and hear the same and could notify the in-
fringer of his wrongful act, coupled with a demand that he cease 
and desist •••• 
In order for an individual to protect his lawful rights against 
infringement by this means, it would have been necessary for him to 
maintain an inspection station at more than thirty thousand different 
establishments located in practically every city in the United States, 
which was wholly impossible •••• 1 
It was the Italian composer Giacomo Puccini who first suggested to 
George Maxwell, a representative of his publisher, that a performing 
rights society similar to one already established in Italy should be 
formed within the United States. 
The Society was formally organized on February 13, 1914, by 100 
composers and publishers, led by Nathan Burkan and Victor Herbert, one 
of the leading composers of the day. The functioning of the Society has 
been aptly described by Edward N. Waters, of the Library of Congress 
Music Division, in his biography of Herbert: 
Fundamentally the operations of ASCAP are simple. The members assign 
to the Society the performing rights in their own works, and the 
Society in turn licenses the use of suoh works in return for royalties. 
The royal ties are divided among the Society's members according to 
a scheme which is a completely confidential internal arrangement. 
There are always dissatisfied members; but human nature has its 
limitations, and the small earner invariably feels he receives less 
than he deserves.2 
lEdward N. Waters, Victor Harbert, A Life in Musio (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1956), PP• 436-437. 
2 Ibid., p. 439 -
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It is interesting to note. in the light of modern technology, that 
the copyright infringements which bothered ASCAP's founders were pro-
pounded by "restaurants. dance halls, cabarets. midnight revues, dinner 
dances and after-theatre revues."3 Today, however, the bulk of ASCAP's 
license fees come from broadcasters. 4 
The Society had not been in existence for half a year when a court 
battle threatened to overturn the principles upon which A.SC.AP had been 
founded. The John Church Co., publisher of John Philip Sousa's music, 
brought suit against the Hilliard Hotel Co., claiming that the Vanderbilt 
Hotel had played Sousa's march, From Maine to Oregon, without authoriza-
tion and without paying a performance fee. 
The publisher was upheld by Judge Lacombe in the U. s. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York. But the case was appealed, 
and Judge Ward, of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed 
the lower court, stating: 
We are not convinced ••• that the defendants played From Maine to 
Oregon for profit within the meaning of these words in our copy-
right act. If the complainant's construction of it is right, then 
a church in which a copyrighted anthem is played is liable, together 
with the organist and every member of the choir, not only to in-
junction, but in damages in the sum of $10 for each performance •••• 5 
Society members were stunned by this reversal. If music perfonued 
in restaurants was not to be considered by the courts to be "public per-
formances for profit" within the meaning of the Copyright Act the concepts 
upon which the Society was established were invalid. 
3rbid., p. 436. 
4u.s.Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5921. 
To Re uire Jukebox O erators to Pa Fees, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959, 131. 
5church v. Hilliard, 221 Fed. 229 (1915). 
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Herbert and Burkan promptly initiated another action, this time 
against Shanley's Restaurant where it was alleged that an unauthorized 
perfonnance of Herbert's Sweethearts was given . This t i me Herbert and 
Burkan sought damages under the dramatist's clause of the Act, which 
reserves exolusi ve performance rights, regardless of profit, to the 
composer. The song Sweethearts was part of a larger dramatic work by 
the same name. Herbert claimed the performance, irrespective o f profit, 
was an infringement. 6 
The strategy failed. Judge Learned Hand cited Church-Hilliard as 
authority for the principle that music in a public restaurant is not 
performed for profit. 
Herbert's appeal was unsuccessful. Judge Rogers stated that the 
dramatico-musical rights in the separate song Sweethearts had been lost 
because the sheet music version failed to state that the "comic opera 
from which the song was taken was itself copyrighted. 117 
Both Judge Hand and Judge Rogers overlooked the most fundamental 
issue, which was the profit motive. ASCAP's future appeared dubious. 
Herbert appealed once again, to the U.S. Supreme Court. On Jan. 22. 
1917, Justice Olivar Wendell Holmes "achieved a musical immortality" by 
reversing the lower courts and deciding for Herbert. Both the Shanley 
oase and the Church-Hilliard decision were embraced, and ASCAP's victory 
was comple te. Justice Holmes' decision set the stage for a half-century 
of copyright litigation. The crux of the problem was stated thus: 
If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a perfonnance 
where money is taken in at the door, they are very imperfeotly pro-
tected. Performances not different in kind from those of the 
defendents could be given that might compete with and even destroy 
6w-aters, ~•~-,PP• 447-454. 
7Ibid., PP• 452-454. -
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the success of the monopoly that the law intends the plaintiffs to 
have. It is enough to say that there is no need to construe the 
statute so narrowly. The defendants' performances are not 
eleemosynary. They are a part of a total for which the public pays, 
and the fact that the price of the whole is attributed to a parti-
cular item which those present are expected to order is not important. 
It is true that musio is not the sole object. but neither is the 
food, which probably could be got cheaper elsewhere. The object is 
a repast in surroundings that to people having limited powers of 
conversation or disliking the rival noise give a luxurious pleasure 
not to be had from eating a silent meal. If music did not pay. it 
would be given up. If it pays, it pays out of the public's pocket. 
Whether it pays or not. the purpose of employing it is profit, and 
that is enough. 8 
Thus the stage was set for the growth of ASCAP as a powerful 
champion of composers' rights. It was seven years before the Society 
paid royal ties to members. At the end of the first year only $10,000 
had been collected in hotel licenses. 9 But in the early twenties broad-
casting began to grow, and the courts soon found that broadcasting 
constituted public and profitable performances of copyrighted music.lo 
ASCAP began to issue annual contracts to radio stations, similar to its 
hotel and restaurant licenses, for rights to broadcast music under the 
Society's controi. 11 
ASCAP's domain later was extended to motion pictures. After World 
War II television was added. In 1952, ASCAP's gross income had risen to 
$17,672,000, of which $16,343,000 was domestio. 12 In 1958. ASCAP•s 
receipts from licenses totaled $28,234,477. The organization spent 
8Herbert v. Shanlei, 242 U.S. 591 (1917). 
9waters, ~- cit., P• 442. The average rate per hotel was 
$8.23 per month. 
lOBuck v. Jewell LaSalle, 32 F. 2d 366 (1929). 
llThomas H. Belviso, "Music Rights in Radio," Music in Radio 
Broadcasting (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1946), pp. 115-118. 
l2variety, Apr. 8, 1953, P• l. quoted in Stanley Rothenberg, 
Copyright and Public Performance of Music (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), 
p. 28. 
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$5,180.083 on administrative expenses (roughly 17 percent) and distributed 
$23,261,671 among its membership in the U.S. and abroad. Total receipts, 
~ 13 including licenses, membership dues and interest on notes. were 9 28,441,764. 
B. Broadcast Music, Inc. 
ASCAP went to the broadcasters in 1932 with a new license fee system 
to replace the flat-fee contract which had been used prevlously. Broad-
casters objected strenuously, but signed the new contracts and began 
operating under the percentage fee system. But the discontent grew 
stronger. Neville Miller, then president of the National Association of 
Broadcasters, said: 
Having no source or music supply other than ASCAP and one or two 
individual publishers of classical music, broadcasters •• • were 
forced to submit to a principle which they then disapproved and have 
always regretted. That principle was the payment of a percentage 
of the broadcasters' gross receipts from the sale of broadcasting 
time, regardless of whether the time was consumed in playing ASCAP 
music, non-ASCAP music or no music at all. This principle never 
has been applied by ASCAP to any other industry using music •••• 14 
Shortly thereafter an organization call The Radio Program Foundation 
was established by the broadcasters, "to create a music supply sufficiently 
large to allow all stations to forego their contracts with ASCAP. 1115 
Although the Foundation acquired radio performance rights for a number of 
domestic and foreign catalogs it still was neoessary for broadcasters to 
do business with ASCAP, by virtue of the Society's increasing size and 
power. 
13u.s. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5921, 
To Re uire Jukebox erators to Pa Ro al Fees, 86th Cong., 1st Seas. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959, pp. 218-219. 
l\u_11er and Mills, ASCAP-NAB CONTROVERSY, The Issues, 11 Air. L. 
Rev. 394, 399 (1940), quoted in Rothenberg,~-~•• pp. 40-41. 
15Ibid., P• 41. 
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At the expiration of ASCAP licenses in December, 1940, the Society 
again offered a new license fee system, this time embracing not only the 
individual stations but also the networks. The NAB promptly announced a 
boycott of ASCAP nrusic conunencing at midnight, December 31. ASCAP was 
forced to mediate, and the new contract represented concessions from both 
sides. 16 
But months of negotie.tion were sufficient to establish BMI which, 
formed by NAB, was stocked by independent non-ASCAP compositions and 
supplied by publishers not in the ASCAP fold. Its list has continued to 
grow since 1940.17 
ASCAP's dual-payment proposal was modified considerably, not only by 
pressure from broadcasters and BMI but also by pressure from the government. 
The Consent Decree which resulted from the deliberations reads as follows: 
In so far as network radio broadcasting is concerned, the issuance 
of a single license, authorizing and fixing a single license fee for 
such performance for network radio broadcasting, shall permit the 
simultaneous broadcasting of such performance by all stations on the 
network which shall broadcast such performance, without requiring 
separate licenses for such several stations for such performance.18 
Present ASCAP contracts provide that the Society receive a percentage 
of gross after deductions of sales commissions and cost of interconnecting 
facilities, regardless of whether the sponsor pays the network or the 
affiliated stations. 19 
16Ibid., P• 43. 
17~., p. 42. 
l8consent Decree, ASCAP, Civil Action No. 13-95 entered March 4, 
1941, section II, 4, ~-, P• 43. 
19~., PP• 43-44. 
Despite agreement with ASCAP, BMI remained as an effective buffer 
for f uture negotiation. It also began to develop talent just as ASCAP 
had done in its early days. Today, both organizations are influential. 
In 1962 BMI had a gross income of $5,607,842. which compares with 
ASCAP's 20 17,672,000. 
In addition to ASCAP and BMI there are several smaller. privately-
owned licensing organizat ions. of which SESAC is the largest. SESAC 
licenses principally classical and western music, as opposed to popular 
songs which are the mainstay of ASCAP and BMI. In 1952, SESAC received 
about $1 million from performing rights licenses. 21 
20ibid., P• 44. 
21Ibid •• P• 28. -
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CHAPTER IV 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN COPYRIGHT 
A. The Matter of Peti'orming Rights 
Like most matters involving l aw, copyright enforcement has been high-
lighted since 1909 by a few landmark cases which toda:y serve to guide 
copyright users in practical applications of the Act. A key "performance 
rights" case was Herbert v. Shanley. 1 described in the previous chapter, 
which established the doctrine that copyrighted music performed in a 
restaurant constitutes a "public performance for profit" within the meaning 
of the Act. The decision has been extended to virtually all public places 
of business which do not charge an admission fee but which are operated 
for profit. In the next chapter we shall investigate a notable exception 
involving one facet in the rise of modem technology. 
As the years between the two world wars passed, cases in copyright 
law primarily were aimed at bringing more and more public business 
establishments under the "public performance for profit" doctrine. In 
1928 Berlin v. Daigle2 placed dance halls in the same category as restau-
rants, making them liable for infringement i f not licensed by ASCAP. The 
next year, the Dreamland Ballroom case reaffirmed the doctrine. 3 
In 1922, deciding Harms v. Cohen# Judge Thompson oited the Shan~ 
case as justification for extending the profit motive to motion pictures, 
saying: "I fail to see any distinotion in law in favor of the performance 
1242 U.S. 591 (1917). 
226 F.2d 149 (1928). 
336 F.2d 354 (1929). 
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of copyrighted musical compositions in moving-picture theaters to which 
a charge for admission is made •••• 11 4 
26 
The music referred to by Judge Thompson was played on a piano by an 
accompanist who watched the silent screen and played music appropriate to 
the action. The analogy could be made directly to live musicians playing 
in a restaurant or in any public establishment operated for profit. 
B. Cases Dealing Wi.th -~roadoastin~ 
In the early twenties music and broadcasting were becoming synonomous 
in the public eye. Inevitably, ASCAP sought to add broadcasters to its 
license fee system. In 1923 the Society, acting in the name of M. Wit.mark 
& Son, one of its member publishers, brought suit against radio station 
WOR in Newark, New Jersey, claiming it had broadcast the song "Mother 
Machree" without paying a royalty fee. The defendant denied that the 
perfonnance could be considered profitable, on grounds that the music was 
broadcast without charge to the radio listeners. 
In the Shanlel case Justice Holmes had drawn upon the lack of a direct 
admittance fee by stating : "The defendants' performances ••• are a part of 
a total for which the public pays •••• " In Wi tmark v. Bamberger Judge 
Lynch applied the same reasoning. He stated: 
We have already stated that the Bamberger Co. makes no direct charge 
to those who avail themselves of the opportunity to listen to its 
daily programs. The question then is : Is the broadcasting done for 
an indirect profit? In determining this we think it is proper to look 
to the reason for broadcasting at all. Why was it done? What was it 
done for? What was the object or, to use the term of Justice Holmes, 
what was the "purpose? " We know the purpose o.f the restaurant pro-
prietor of the moving-picture theater. What was the purpose of the 
defendant in expending thousands of dollars in establishing and 
operating this broadcasting station? 5 
4279 Fed. 276 (1922 ) . 
65 F.Supp. 368 (1933). 
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Radio broadcasts of copyrighted music thus were deemed to be "publ ic 
performances i'or profi t 11 within the meani ng of the Copyright Act . But t he 
doct r i ne was not all embracing i n i ts legal implications . Soon the 
ques t ion of whether a radio broadcast was a "public performance" at all 
was at stake. In Remick v. AAA Co., Judge Hickenlooper stated: 
In order to constitute a public performance in the sense i n which 
we t hink Congress intended the words, it is absolutely essential 
that there be an assemblage of persons -- an audience congregated 
for the purpose of hearing that which transpires at t he place of 
amusement. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
We simply feel that the rendition of a copyrighted piece of music 
in the studio of a broadcasting s t ation where t he public are not 
admitted and can not come ••• is no more a public performance ••• 
within t he intent of Congress, than the perforated music r oll, 
which enables t he reproduction of copyrighted music by one without 
musical education, is a copy of such music. A private performance 
for profit is not within the act, nor is a public performance not 
for profit. All contemplate an audience which may hear the rendi-
tion itself through the transmission of sound waves, and not merely 
a reproduction of t he sound by means of mechanical devices and 
electromagnetic waves in ether. 6 
But Judge Hickenlooper's analysis of radio broadcasting did not stand 
for long. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed his decision in 
1925. The words of Judge Mack are particularly significant: 
A performance, in our judgment, is no less public because the 
listeners are unable to communicate with one another, or are not 
a s sembled within an inclosure, or gathered together in some open 
stadium or park or other public place. Nor can a performance, in 
our judgment, be deemed private because each listener may enjoy it 
alone in the privacy of his home. Radio broadcasting is intended 
to, and in fact does, reach a very much l arger number of the public 
at the moment of the rendition than any other medium of performance. 
The artist is consciously addressing a great, though unseen and 
widely scattered audience, and is therefore participating in a 
public perfonnance.7 
6Remick v. AAA, 298 Fed. 628 (1924). 
7Remick v. AAA, 5 F.2d 411 (1925). 
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Judge Mack's acceptance of the inevitability of advancing technology 
was evident in his consideration of the new medium, radio: 
While the fact that the radio was not developed at the time the 
Copyright Act was enacted may raise some question as to whether 
it properly comes within the purview of the statute, it is not by 
that fact alone excluded from the statute. In other words, the 
statute may be applied to new situations not anticipated by Congress, 
if, fairly construed, such situations come within its intent and 
meaning. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
While statutes should not be stretched to apply to new situations 
not fairly within their scope, they should not be so narrowly con-
strued as to permit their evasion because of changing habits due to 
new inventions and discoveries. 8 
With broadcasters well within the fold, ASCAP then turned to the 
listener. It was the Society's aim to prove that radios operated in 
commercial establishments were done so for profit, and to force license 
fees from the owners. In 1928 suit was brought by Gene Buck, then 
president of ASCAP, against the Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., alleging that 
the hotel operated by the company used radio instead of an orchestra to 
entertain its guests. The effort at f irst was unsuccessful. Judge Otis 
stated: 
It is true that if one plays on his phonograph a record of a piece 
of music he is performing. If it is a copyrighted musical com-
position, and if the performance is publio and for profit, then 
his act is an infringement of the copyright. Plaintiffs say that 
there is no difference in principle between playing by phonograph 
a record impressed on bakelite and playing by radio receiver a 
record impressed on the ether. Obviously there is a difference. 
The record on bakelite is a separate and distinct thing from the 
original performance in the studio where the record was made. 
Playing that record is performing anew the musical composition 
imprinted on it. The waves thrown out upon the ether are not a 
record of the original perfonnance. They are the original performance. 
Their reception is not a reproduction, but a hearing of the original 
performance. 
The reception of a musical composition on a radio receiver is not 
a performance at all • •• If it was a perfonnanoe of a musical com-
position, it was a performance, not by the defendant, but by the 
broadcaster, on the defendant's instrument.9 
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The case was appealed to the Supreme Court where, in 1931, the decision 
was made that radio broadcasting does, indeed, constitute performance and 
liability for infringement does not end at the broadcasting studio. Mr. 
Justice Brandeis, delivering the opinion of the Court, made the following 
classic statements: 
The parties agree that the owner of a private radio receiving set 
who in his own home invites friends to hear a musical composition 
which is being broadcast would not be liabl e for infringement. For, 
even if this be deemed a performance, it is neither public nor for 
profit. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
We are satisfied that the reception of a radio broadcast and its 
translation into audible sound is not a mere audition of the original 
program. It is essentially a reproduction •••• Thus music played 
at a distant broadcasting studio is not directly heard at the 
receiving set. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Reproduction ••• amounts to a performance. 
In addition, the ordinary receiving set, and the distribution 
apparatus here employed by the hotel company are equipped to amplify 
the broadcast program after it has been received. Such sets clearly 
are more than the use of mere mechanical acoustic devices for the 
better hearing of the original program. The guests of the hotel 
hear a reproduction brought about by the acts of the hotel •••• 
There is no difference in substance between the case where a hotel 
engages an orchestra to furnish the music and that where, by means 
of the radio set and loudspeakers here employed, it .furnished the 
same music for the same purpose. In each the music is produced by 
instrumentalities under its controi. 10 
The decision produced a new doctrine which would henceforth be applied 
to matters of broadcast copyright. It was the doctrine of "public reception 
for profit" and it would be applied in future years to a wide variety of 
9Buck v . Jewell-LaSalle, 32 F.2d 366 (1929). 
lOBuck v. Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. 191 (1931). 
30 
situations involving radio reception. Of significance also was Justice 
Brandeis' comment that: "Intention to infringe is not essential under the 
act, and knowledge of the selection to be played is immaterial." 
On the matter of profit, Justice Brandeis stated: 
The defendant contends that there was no performance within the 
meaning of the act because it is not shown that the hotel operated 
the receiving set and loudspeakers for profit. Unless such acts 
were carried on for profit, there can, of course, be no liability. 
But whether there was a performfice does not depend upon the 
existence of the profit motive. 1 
As a matter of fact, the question of profit in a hotel's use of music 
already had been established by Herbert v. Shanley and Justice Brandeis 
simply was establishing a guide for determining what constituted public 
performance in a hotel. 
C. Other Cases on Musical Copyright 
A significant case dealing with reception of a live broadcast which 
began as a private venture but developed profitable overtones as it progressed 
is Metropolitan Opera Assn. v. Wagner~Nichols Recorder Corp. In this case 
the "Corp." was a pair of private individuals who made a home tape r ecording 
of a Metropolitan Opera broadcast, had records pressed through a private 
laboratory, then offered the records for sale, ostensibly only to members 
of the chorus. Ultimately, however, copies of the records appeared in a 
New York record store, and it was this which precipitated the court action. 
The matter was not one of copyright, in this instance, since the music 
was in the public domain. Rather, the issue was unfair competition. In 
finding for the Opera Association, Justice Greenberg stat ed: 
Such injury as may be inflicted on the defendants is the direct 
result of thei r un onscionable business practices and their invasion 
of the moral standards of the market place. The cry of the defendants 
that others similarly transgress does not confer immunity on them 
l lL-Ibid. 
for their forbidden activities, nor may they find solace in the 
claim that they have not been guilty of connnon-law fraud •••• 
They have embarked upon a hazardous enterprise which equity will 
not hesitate to strike down. Cast in its proper environment, we 
have here a business venture purposed to gather in the harvest 
the seeds of which were planted and nurtured by others at great 
expense and with consummate skill. 12 
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Had the broadcaster (The American Broadcasting Co.) been playing a 
record instead of a live performance, redress could well have come by 
virtue of' the performer's unique common-law right in the performance. 
Such was the case in Pennsylvania in Waring v. WD.AS. 13 Waring had made 
several recordings for the Victor Talking Machine Co. but had insisted 
on the wording, "Not licensed for radio broadcasts", being placed on the 
label. WDAS, a Pennsylvania radio station, broadcast two of these 
recordings, the music being covered by the station's license with ASCAP. 
Waring promptly sued on the basis of the Pennsylvanians' unique 
performance . In the decision it was noted that the Copyright statute 
provides no rights for a performing artist i n his interpretation of music, 
and noted that Waring had no statutory basis for complaint. But he was 
upheld under the doctrine of unfair competition, the court stating that 
an "orchestra which gave radio broadcasts for pay is in competition with 
broadcast station, and when latter, without authority, broadcasts phono-
graph transcription of music played by orchestra, such broadcast is 
enjoined as unfair competition."14 
The court also noted that playing of a musical composition over radio 
does not "constitute publication which operates as abandonment to public 
12101 N. Y. S. 2d 483 (1950). 
13194 Atl . 631 (1937). 
14rbid. 
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use. 11 If this were not true, since a performance is not anti tled to copy-
right, common-law rights in the music woul d be sacrificed leaving the 
owner nothing on which to base an infringement proceeding. 14A 
Although the decision still stands in Pennsylvania, an opposing view-
point was taken by Judge Learned Hand in RCA v. Whiteman when Whiteman 
sought to prevent the broadcast of r ecords he had made for RCA by the WBO 
Broadcasting Corp. In refusing to grant the injunction, Judge Hand stated: 
It is true that the law is otherwise in Pennsylvania, whose Supreme 
Court in 1937 decided that such legend as the records at bar bore, 
fixed a servitude upon the disks in the hands of any buyer •••• We 
have, of course given the most respectful consideration to the con-
clusions of that great court, but with much regret we find ourselves 
unconvinced for the reasons we have tried to state. However, since 
that is the law of Pennsylvania and since the broadcasting will 
reach receiving sets in that state, it wi ll constitute a tort 
committed there; and if an injunction could be confined to those sets 
alone, it would be proper. It cannot; for even if it be mechanically 
possible to prevent any broadcasting through the angle which the 
Stat e of Pennsylvania subtends at the transmission station, that 
would shut out points both in front of, and beyond, Pennsylvania. 
We must therefore choose between denying any injunction what ever --
since in our judgment the act is unlawful only in Pennsylvania --
or enjoining W.B.O. Broadcasting Corp. from broadcasting throughout 
the Union and in Canada in order to prevent a tort in Pennsylv·anie. 
alone. This would be an obvious misuse of the writ which goes only 
in aid of justice .15 
Common-law rights in music cannot be retained after the records have 
been pressed and distributed. This was made clear by Judge Igoe in 
Shapiro, Bernstein v. Miracle Records: 
It seems to me that production and sale of a phono graph record 
is fully as much of a publication as production and sale of sheet 
music. I can see no practical distinction between the two. If one 
constitutes an abandonment, so should the other. 
On Motion for New Trial 
It seems to me that publication is a practical question and does 
not rest on any technical definition of the word "copy". Nor do 
1~ Publication is analyzed in P.H.Morrison, "Copyright Publication 
and Phonograph Records," Georgetown Law Journal, (Summer, 1960), 683. 
15114 F.2d 86 (1940). 
33 
the notice and registration provisions of the Copyright Act ••• 
detennine the i ssue here. Modern recording has made possible the 
preservation and reproduction of sound which theretofore had dis-
appeared i:rmnediately upon its creation. When phonographs of a 
musical composition are available for purchase in every city, town 
and hamlet, certainly the dissemination of the composition to the 
public is complete, and is as complete as by sale of a sheet music 
reproduction of the composition. The Copyright Act grants a monopoly 
only under limited conditions. If plainti1'f 1 s argument is to succeed 
here, then a perpetual monopoly is granted without the necessity of 
compliance with the Copyright Act.l 
Judge Igoe's decision has been widely criticized. I t is not certain 
it would stand in all other states, although it has been cited with favor 
by a number of other judges.17 A newspaper dispatch from Hollywood which 
appeared in The Billboard of August 6, 1955, reads in part as follows: 
The Hon. Leon Yankewich, chief jurist of the U.S. Federal Court 
here and an eminent authority in the field of copyright law, this 
week declared he disagreed with the far-reaching Igoe decision, 
at a meeting of the California Copyright Conference. 
Judge Yankewich, who addressed the group on the subject titled 
"What Does Copyright Protect?" indicated that it was a popular 
misconcept ion that the Igoe decision was federal law. He averred 
that jurists in jurisdictions other than Judge Igoe's could hold 
that a recording of an uncopyrighted song does not constitute 
publication, and as such would not fall in the public domain. 18 
D. Common Law and Record Dubbing 
Ever since the birth of the phonograph record, unscrupulous attempts 
to copy the disos and pass off the copies as originals, usually at con-
siderable discount, have been recorded. In recent years the practice has 
grown to immense proportions.19 
1691 F.Supp. 473 (1950). 
17stanley Rothenberg, Legal Protection of Literature, Art and 
Music (New York: Clark Boardman Co., Ltd., 1960), P• 64. 
18~•• p. 66. 
19wall Street Journal, April 20, 1961, p. 1. 
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The present state of the electronic art makes the act of dubbing quite 
simple. A record purchased in a record store is re-recorded onto tape, 
and the tape re-processed to disc form by any one of several dozen pro-
cessing firms in the United States. New jackets, identical to the original, 
can be printed by a:ny color press. The product then is sold at discount 
to record store chains, grocery stores, discount merchandisers or any 
merchant interested in selling discs at less than retail price. The cost 
of pirating is vastly less than the coat of making an original record, 
since the pirate pays no royal ties, no perronnance fees and no musicians' 
wages. 
Protection against record pirating under the Copyright Act is extremely 
limited. The general damage provisions20 are not applicable. Subsection 
( e) of section 101 states that a plaintiff is "entitled to recover in lieu 
of profits and damages a royalty" which, in section l(e), is stated as 
"2 cents on each such part manufactured." In the absense of a valid 
license, the court may also award "a further sum, not to exceed three 
times the amount provided by section 1, subsection (e) ••• by way of 
d lt 1121 damages, an not as a pena y •••• 
The practical effect of this limitation is to make recovery of damages 
for record pirating equal to eight cents per infringing copy, instead of 
the $250 minimum and $5,000 maxi.mum allowable under the general damage 
. . 22 prov1.s1.ona. 
2017 u.s.c. B101(b). 
2111 u.s.c. !l(e). 
22u.s. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 6921, 
To Re uire Jukebox O erators to Pa Ro alt Fees, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959, pp. 103-117. 
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But a discouraging problem of recovery is the inability to prove 
exactly how many discs were pirated. In Shapiro, Bernstein v. Remington 
Records23 the defendant openly acknowledged that he did not keep records 
on the state of his business. As a result, although the plaintiff pre-
sented "expert testimony" on the number of discs purported t o have been 
sold by Remington, the testimony was not allowed on the basis that it was 
"not within the realm of expert testimony and ••• purely speculative. " 
Perhaps the most famous case of all was Shapiro, Bernstein v. Goody. 24 
Sam Goody operated a discount record store in New York City, where he sold 
records at far below the r etail cost of his competitors. His record sales, 
according to testimony, were considerable, in excess, so witnesses said, 
of the numbers of discs supplied him by reputable manufacturers. But 
during the trial Goody maintained that his "records of the transaction" 
disclosed quantities of records which were vastly less than other witnesses 
were convinced (and alleged they could prove) he actually had received. 
As a result, the court reluctantly awarded the plaintiffs the two-cent 
royalty on the lesser number of "infringing copies." The oourt was forced 
even to deny the treble damages, saying: "The language providing for a 
recovery against the seller of 'a royalty' is scarcely adequate to provide 
a recovery of a sum amounting to the royalty plus the royalty trebled. " 
The court took note of the insufficiency of statutory damages by stating: 
In the Copyright Act of 1909, Congress ••• did not ••• include 
mechanical reproduction of music in its definition or copy, although 
to have done so would have been an easy solution, granting the 
musical proprietor complete copyright protection against mechanical 
reproduction. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
23265 F. 2d 263 (1956). 
24248 F.2d 260 (1957). 
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The inequiti es and the inadequacies of the present law cry out for 
correction. It is scant comfort to the publisher plaintiffs herein 
to be told that although their plight is distressing, there are others 
in the industry, notably recording companies and talented performers, 
who at present receive even less protection from record pirates and 
those who distribute their wares. It is equally harsh to tell them 
that their remedy lies in the legislatures when the problems of the 
recording industry have been before various legislative bodies over 
the years, and the conflicting interests involved have prevented 
any solution. 25 
The lack of adequate damages for relief under the statute has had a 
profound effect on the legal outlook not only with respect to record 
pirates, but to others who would use the music for non-commercial purposes. 
The trend in recent years has been away from relief under the Copyright 
statute and toward greater use of state common-law protection and the 
doctrine of unfair competition. As a matter of fact, the courts have been 
leaning in the direction of greater protection of performers and record 
manufacturers, despite a plea by some jurists that adoption of common-law 
principles will serve to negate the concept of a "temporary monopoly" 
which, they maintain, is all the Constitution intended. Common law pro-
tection may be unlimited, and there is growing evidence that protection 
under unfair competition may be equally unlimited. 
Perhaps the most significant case in this area was Capitol Records v. 
Mercury Records. 26 Both Capitol and Mercury had purchased matrices of 
recordings made by Telefunken in Germany during the war and confiscated 
25u.s. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5921, 
2£.• ~•• PP• 111-112. Difficulties of collecting damages for record pirating 
fi gured prominently in testimony of Julian T. Abeles, counsel for the Music 
Publishers' Protective Association, Inc., in hearings to amend the jukebox 
exemption. Two additional studies of the Goody case which warrant mention 
are "Civil Remedies for Disklegging," Southern California Law Review, (Winter, 
1960), 190; and "Mechanical Reproduction of Musical Reproductions -- Liability 
of Non-Manufacturing Seller of Unauthorized Records," George Washington Law 
Review, (June, 1958), 745. 
26109 F.Supp. 330 (1952). 
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afterwards by the Czechoslovakian authorities. The eventual award of the 
matrices to Capitol is relatively insignificant in this study. What is 
important is the court's view that the "copying or reproduction of a 
phonograph record is unfair competition, 11 and that "the work of the 
artists ••• constituted ••• a valuable property right, which will be pro-
tected from unfair competition by one who misappropriated that property." 
The court cited Metropolitan Opera v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.27 
which stated that unfair competition is no longer limited to "palming off" 
of goods. RCA v. Whiteman28 also was quoted, the significant statement 
being: "It would follow ••• that, if a conductor played over the radio. 
and if his performance was not an abandonment of his rights. it would be 
unlawful without his consent to record it as it was received from a 
receiving set and to use the recora.28A 
The matter of an artist's rights in his "distinctive performance"• 
first noted in Waring v. WDAS,29 appeared again in Gieseking v. Urania 
Raoords30 where it was held that a performer's right should be upheld. 
Judge Lupiano cited the Capitol Records case and stated: 
27107 N. Y.S. 2d 795 (1950). 
28114 F.2d 86 (1939). 
28Acommon-law aspects of the Capitol Records case are analyzed 
in "Common Law Literary Property -- Conflict of Laws." Baylor Law Review, 
(Fall, 1955), 442. Performance rights come under scrutiny in B. Kaplan, 
"Performer's Right and Copyright: The Capitol Records Case, 11 Harvard 
Law Review, (January, 1966), 409. 
29194 Atl.631 (1937). 
30165 N.Y.S. 2d 171 (1956). 
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A performer has a property right in his performance that it shall 
not be used for a purpose not intended, and particularly in a manner 
which does not fairly represent his service. The originator or his 
assignee of records of performances of an artist does not, by putting 
such records on public sale, dedicate the right to copy or sell 
the record. 
The trend which has emerged over the past fifty years, as evidenced 
by the cases enwnerated here, shows a distinct decline in the significance 
of the Copyright Act of 1909 and a general move toward court-made law 
with common-law rights and unfair competition as its roots. 31 
31Barbara A. Ringer, "The Unauthori.zed Duplication of Sound 
Recordings," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 26, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1957), pp. 10-20. 
CHAPTER V 
RECORDING FOR FUN: AN APPRAISAL 
A. 'Rights• in Musical Compositions 
In attempting to outline the extent to which non-commercial recordings 
of music can be made., listened to and distributed by a non-professional., 
non-commercial recordist., some basic guidelines can be drawn very quickly. 
The fundamental matter of "profit" serves to answer one of the first 
questions a home recordist is likely to raise: "Can I sell copies of 
phonograph records?" Obviously., he cannot. Although there is no specific 
clause in the Copyright Act which prohibits the "selling of pirated 
recordings" a number of actions under the doctrine of unfair competition 
are on record and give signs of becoming increasingly significant in 
coming years .1 
If an individual cannot sell pirated recordings., can he make copies 
at all? And., assuming he can., would he be permitted to "give" them to a 
friend., either free or in exchange for a blank tape? 
In order to answer this perplexing question it is necessary to con-
sider the " rights" which exist in the commodity under transfer -- the music. 
Before music has been conceived there can., of course, be no rights. 
But once the music exists as notes on staff paper it has substance. It is 
an idea., or collection of ideas., which has value. In the marketplace of 
literary ideas it can command a value equal to the prestige of its author. 
In rare instances it can command many times that figure., if overwhelming 
public acceptance follows. 
1The Metropolitan Opera and Capitol Records cases are perhaps 
the most significant in this mat ter. 
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Who owns this intangible product? Its creator, in the first instance , 
and the music performing rights society to which he assigns it, in the 
second. But there also are other owners: the artist who perfonns itJ 
the manufacturer who records it; the radio station which broadcasts it. 
All have a share, and any one can sue for misappropriation. 
The author has a vested common-law right in a piece of mu.sic until 
it is published. His common-law rights exceed those he will acquire by 
copyright. He has the right to "prevent the copying, publication, or use 
of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor. 112 
If his music is pirated, he has the right to prosecute. He may permit his 
music the luxury of public performance, at a fee decided in advance with 
the musicians, without harming his common-law rights. 
Unfortunately, a piece of music stands little chance of producing a 
profit for its owner if it remains unpublished and unrecorded. As a 
practical matter an author's common-law rights must soon be relinquished 
if his livlihood depends upon consistent creation and sale of music. 
It is customary for a modern song writer to sign an agreement with a 
recording or publishing firm (or both) to record his music and simultaneously 
to publish it. His contract guarantees him a fee for each record which is 
manufactured. An established music writer also may receive a "bonus." 
The music is recorded by an artist, paid by the recording company 
(the artist often receives more for his work than the song's composer). 
The publisher (or recordist functioning as publisher) files for copyright 
and submits the requisite number of file copies to the Register of Copyright.3 
217 u.s.c. 12. 
3u.s. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings on R.R. 5921, 
To Re uire Jukebox erators to P Ro al Fees, 86th Cong., 1st Sass. 
Washington: Government rinting Office, 1959, p. 99. 
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Once a piece of music has been published a composer's rights, to a 
degree, are lessened, despite the forrne.lity of a government-backed guarantee. 
The Copyright Act reserves for the owner of a musical copyright only the 
rights to "public performance for profit. 114 He no longer can prevent mere 
public performance, nor can he prevent private performance for profit. In 
fact, because of the "compulsory provisions" of the Copyright Act, he is 
powerless to prevent further recording of his work by any company which 
so desires. 
Although an author's rights are diminished, a copyright does protect 
him from unauthorized public performance for profit. An author can collect 
damages for all performances of his music which occur in public and which 
are intended for profit. He retains these rights for a period of twenty-
eight years.5 He may renew the copyright for another twenty-eight year 
period. After that his rights cease. The work reverts to the public 
domain. 
An author may lose his rights under copyright by ways other than 
simple expiration of term. Copyright may be lost (or never gained) by 
failure to comply with the administrative requirements for copyright 
notice. These routines are spelled out in detail in the Copyright Act. 
They establish time limits for filing and provide for notice of the 
existence of copyright. Whenever copyright is lost by any of these means, 
the music immediately falls into the public domain. 6 
417 u.s.c. Bl(e). 
611 u.s.c. 124J 17 u.s.c. 126. 
611 U. s.c. 114. 
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It had been thought that since records are not copies. in a legal 
sense. the sale and distribution of discs did not constitute publication 
which would end a composer's rights at common law. But precisely the 
opposite view was established in Shapiro, Bernstein v. Miracle Records. 
The judge showed a practical turn of mind when he stated: 11lt seems to 
me that publication is a practical question and does not rest on any 
tecl:mical definition of the word "copy. 117 
The decision shattered ownership rights in a number of recordings 
then on the market. Although the authors of the music contained on the 
recordings thought they had perpetual comm.on-law rights, they were surprised 
to find that their failure to register and publish now meant forfeiture of 
all rights. the music reverting to the public domain. 
When music has been recorded, the 11compulsory provisions 11 of the 
Copyright Act permit anyone to make recordings simply by filing the 
proper forms and mailing "2 cents for each part manufactured" to the com-
poser at an address shown on the records of the Copyright Office. 8 
Because of this provision it has been argued that a home recordist 
could comply with the law by filing intent-to-record forms and paying two 
cents for each tape he plans to make. Certainly this was not the original 
intent of the Copyright Act. But neither was the jukebox exemption, though 
it has survived twenty-two years of Congressional hearings-
In light of recent developments in copyright law it is important to 
note that filing and paying the two-cent fee would not protect a recordist 
from the threat of further litigation under unfair competition. The courts 
791 F.Supp. 473 (1950). 
811 u.s.c. ll(e). 
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have been turning more and more toward a strict interpretation of this 
doctrine in favor of the record manufacturers. More will be said of this 
point later. But it occurs to this writer that the protection offered by 
such an obvious legal "dodge" would be complete, under the tenns of the 
Copyright statute. 
On the other hand, are such extreme measures really necessary? 
Does not the Act's stipulation that an infringer must present a"public 
performance for profit" protect the private listener who merely makes a 
recording for pleasure in the privacy of his home? It is this writer's 
opinion that it does, under the terms of the Copyright Act. It is further 
offered that the "public performance for profit" motive would protect non-
commercial recordists from prosecution even in a relatively widespread 
tape exchange, so long as no money was involved and none of the tapes 
were sold for profit. 
Many manufacturers have proclaimed the merits of copying records on 
tape and then playing the tape to preserve the record in its original, 
mint condition. The technical explanation for such a suggestion is that 
tape does not wear out from repeated playings, whereas discs do. No 
doubt this would be considered "fair use" in a court proceeding where the 
object was to prove unfair competition. 9 
But the step from such en action to "letting a neighbor listen to the 
tape" is a small one, indeed. The next few steps are, individually, 
equally small. If it would not be improper to lend the neighbor the record 
itself, how is it improper to lend him a tape of the record? If such a 
9Roger Needham, "Tape Recording, Photocopying and Fair Use," 
Copyright Law Symposium Number Ten (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959}, P• 99. 
loan is not unlawful when the recipient lives next door, is it unlawful 
when the homes are located 2,500 miles apart? 
Where would the courts draw the line on this process of reasoning? 
44 
Until a specific case is brought before them, no definite answer is possible. 
It has been argued that copying a record on tape is unfair because it 
interferes with listening to another record. Surely such reasoning is ill 
founded. By similar token listening to one record would prevent one from 
listening to another record. The same analogy has been drawn with respect 
to recordings of radio programs. Listening to one program, however, is 
just as much a bar to hearing other programs as listening to a record or, 
for that matter, going to the movies. 
B. Public Performance Analyzed 
It is difficult to see how a recordist could engineer a "private per-
formance for profit. " Even if he could it would not constitute an 
infringement under the terms of the Copyright Act. The key phrase is 
"public performance for profit" and all three elements must exist simul-
taneously in order for an infringement to occur. 10 
What constitutes a "public performance?" The courts have held 
listening to a radio broadcast in a hotel room to be a public performance. 11 
The fact that one's bedroom is found in a hotel instead of one's home does 
not make the hotel room less private, but that is essentially what the 
courts have said. Is there some magic number of attendees which separates 
a "public" performance from one which is distinctly private? Evidently 
there is none. 
1017 u.s.c. ll(e). 
11Buck v . Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. 191 (1931). 
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Remick v. General Electric established the fact that a radio broad-
cast constitutes a "performance" within the terms of the Act. It was 
stated: 
The possessor of a radio receiving set attuned to the station of 
the broadcaster of an authorized performance hears only the selec-
tion as it is rendered by the performer. The performance is one 
and the same whether the "listener in" be at the elbow of the 
leader of the orchestra playing the selection, or at a distance 
of 1,000 miles.12 
Applying old concepts to a new problem of secondary performances was 
not easy, and the trial court two years later found the analogies invalid 
and based a decision on policy, holding that a secondary performance is 
covered by the Copyright Act. The opinion read: 
Certainly those who listen do not per fonn, and therefore do not 
infringe. Can it be said with any greater reason that one who 
enables others to hear participates in the unauthorized performance, 
so as to be a contributory infringer? Surely not, if, as is 
argued by anology, he merely leaves the window open, so that the 
strains of the music may be heard by those in the street below. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The acts of the broadcaster are found in the reactions of his 
instruments, constantly animated and controlled by himself, and 
those acts are quite as continuous and infinitely more complex 
than the playing of the selection by the members of the orchestra.13 
Remember, too, that it was stated in Remick v. American Automobile 
Accessories: 
A performance ••• is no less public because the listeners are unable 
to communicate with one another ••• not within an inclosure, or 
gathered together in some open stadium or park or other public place. 
Nor can a performance ••• be deemed private because each listener 
may enjoy it alone in the privacy of his home. Radio broadcasting 
is intended to, and in fact does, reach a very much larger number of 
the public at the moment of the rendition than any other medium of 
performance. The artist is consciously addressing a great, though 
unseen and widely scattered, audience, and is therefore participating 
in a public performance.14 
124 F.2d 160 (1924). 
13Ibid. 
14298 Fed. 628 (1924). 
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If one tape records a broadcast for listening at a later time, does 
the fact that the broadcast was public make the music public forever? If 
so, all music heard on the radio would be public regardles s of~ it was 
heard just as the courts now consider it public regardl ess of where it is 
heard. Certainly this cannot be true. if the technical anal ogy dra-wn by 
the court in the A.AA case is valid. If the "acts of the broadcaster are 
found in the reactions of his instruments" then the acts of a home recordist 
are equally found in the reactions of~ instruments. If a broadcaster's 
instruments serve to publ i cly disseminate the music, thereby making it 
"public" in the legal sense, then the acts of the recordist serve to con-
fine the music to a single performance (each time the tape is played) and 
thereby, in th.is writer's opinion, render it "private." 
By this line of reasoning music which has been broadcast and tape 
recorded in the home by a private recordist, although public at the time of 
broadcast when reception by millions was possible could be held, on later 
hearing in the privacy of the recordist's living room, to be a "private" 
perfonnance, as private, in fact, as a performance of the original record, 
purchased by the recordist at a record store and played on his own 
phonograph. 
The basis of this hypothesis is the fact that copyright reposes in the 
music itself. and not in the instruments upon which it is recorded. Reoords 
(and also, presumably, tape recordings) cannot be copyrighted. Whether 
music whioh has been recorded is broadcast and re-recorded or not makes no 
difference so far as the copyright in the original piece of music is con-
cerned. Unless the tape is sold for profit, if its maker simply listens to 
it for esthetic satisfaction then the music which is recorded is being 
used as its composer intended when he first licensed its recording. 
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By such reasoning home taping of records off the air could be deemed 
"fair use" just as home taping of an individual's private record collection 
is fair use if the intent is to preserve the records against damage due to 
repeated playing. 
C. The Matter of Distribution 
Carrying the analogy one step further, lending the tape to a neighbor 
could be considered no more an infringement of copyright than lending the 
neighbor a record that was purchased in a music store. 
It was held in Shapiro, Bernstein v. Miracle Records that the "pro-
duction and sale of a phonograph record is fully as much of a publication 
as production and sale of sheet music."16 If the distribution of records 
is sufficient to satisfy publication, would the same sort of distribution 
be sufficient to satisfy the requirements for "public performance?" 
Probably not, unless the records actually were played in public. Although 
the distribution of sheet music does not require that the music actually 
be played on an instrument in order for publication to take place, a record 
must be given a public hearing, presumably before a group of persons 
gathered in an area open to the public, or over the radio, before it can 
be considered to have received a "public performance. " 
A tape exchange , in which a tape was passed from one private indivi-
dual to another private individual, each of whom listens to it privately 
in his own home, would involve no element of public performance. Distri-
bution, therefore, would not amount to "public performance." 
A more fundamental matter is "profit. " One individual has defined 
profit as "equal or greater value." A tape exchange would involve items 
1591 F. Supp. 473 (1950). 
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of "equal value. 11 By this definition the exchange would create an element 
of profit. But the point i s debatable. 
Another definition of profit is "advantage." Certainly, a tape ex-
change would not be undertaken were it not for an advantage. 
By one line of reasoning, a tape exchange might be considered 
"profitable" in matters of satisfaction, techni cal fulfillment or musical 
expression. But an exchange of commercial recordings, purchased at a 
music store, would satisfy the same purpose. There never has been any 
doubt that the exchange of commercial recordings is proper and above 
reproach. 
It seems likely that application of all three elements which are 
essential to infringement -- public performance for profit -- would be 
unusual in any non-commercial tape exchange. It is the opinion of this 
writer that proving i nfringement would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. 
From a practical side, the matter of damages probably would militate 
against any action to prove infringement in the case of a private recordist. 
At the present time restitution is limited to "2 cents per each part 
manufactured" , with the possibility of an additional six cents by way of 
damages. The most any plaintiff could expect to receive in a suit against 
a private recordist is eight cents per tape. The cost of litigation would 
be many times this figure. 
Unless the violation was widely advertised, it is not likely that a 
tape exchange would be attacked from the standpoint of copyright infringe-
ment, even if it involved a public performance for profit. The legal 
grounds are not at all clear. The danger to ASCAP of sueing, and losing, 
is great. Failure in such a suit would simply proliferate the practice of 
home taping well beyond ASCAP's control. 
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Even the American Federation of Musicians, which normally would be 
expected to object to all unpaid performances of music, feels that home 
recording is a "trivial" matter generally unworthy of prosecution. When 
questioned on the matter of home recording, James C. Petrillo, late 
president of the AFM, stated: "Even though the recording companies are 
opposed to such practices ••• the in.fraction is so trivial that recording 
companies would take no action unless such home recording became wide-
spread and impaired or destroyed the sale of records into the homes. 111 6 
There is always the possibility that a revision of the Copyright Act 
someday will establish legal dos and don'ts for the home recordist. 17 
But until then, it would appear that non-profit recording of virtually any 
material could be defended on the basis of "public performance for profit. " 
so far as the Copyright Act is concerned. 
D. Infringement in the Marketplace 
It is interesting to note that the growth of the high fidelity and 
stereo industries have been dependent to a large degree upon a conscious 
and widespread infringement of copyright. In Buck v. Jewell LaSalle it 
was stated: 
It is true that if one plays on his phonograph a record of a piece 
of music he is performing. If it is a copyrighted musical composi-
tion, and if the per1·ormance is public and for profit, then his act 
is an infringement of the copyright. 17A 
161etter from James c. Petrillo dated April 10. 1956. 
l 7It is the aim of this paper to provide a guide to copyright 
planners in matters of non-commercial recording. 
17A283 U.S. 191 (1931 ) . 
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High fidelity and stereo components, as well as conventional radio-
phonograph consoles, are sold in stores which are open to the public and 
which are operated for profit. A high fidelity dealer is as much a 
businessman as the proprietor of the LaSalle Hotel, and his business is 
operated for the same purpose: profit. If playing a radio in a hotel 
infringes, then playing a radio in a high fidelity store also infringes. 
Not only are radios played for purposes of demonstration to customers, 
but tape recorders are used to record music off the air, to demonstrate 
the tape recorders. Thus a recording of a broadcast performance becomes 
both public and profitable. Under the law it constitutes an infringement. 
But no performing rights society ever has sought to collect damages. The 
meagre amount of damages constitute one deterrant. But perhaps more im-
portant is the fact that high fidelity stores, department stores, record 
shops, etc. are the lifeblood of the music industry. For composers to 
chide them in court would be to bite the hand that feeds them. 
Until a ho1ne recordist hears of a widespread campaign by ASCAP to 
stwnp out such practices he probably can record with impunity virtually 
anything for which permission can be secured. As long as he does not sell 
his recordings, or advertise their availability too widely, he is not likely 
to be bothered either by ASCAP, the AFM, or a recording company. While his 
actions may not be morally proper, certainly they are not illegal. From a 
consideration of precedent, as outlined in the preceding chapters, it is 
likely that the courts would adopt this same view. 
E. Few Facts but Many Opinions 
From the foregoing it is evident that there are many opinions and few 
facts. Most copyright authorities are themselves unsure of the best way 
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to handle the home recordist, either legislatively or judicially. A 
newspaper story headlined, "Home Tape Recorders Worry Broadcasters" stated: 
Broadcasting and record companies are looking for a way to keep home 
tape recorder owners from building up large, free music collections ••• 
A man with a home recorder can take down a symphony from the radio 
minus commercials or can borrow and copy record albums and never go 
near a record shop ••• As to a man's taping a broadcast or record 
purely for home consumption ••• it might be possible for the producer 
to prove harm, or unfair c01npeti tion, in that this would forestall a 
potential sale ••• A spokesman for one major recording company told 
the News his firm's lawyers 'feel sure we oan prove that and get a 
favorable ruling, but we're aiming much further before we make a 
move' ••• He said that simply making the act of taping records or 
broadcasts illegal would do little good because 'it would be unenforce-
able ••• The least we're aiming at is a licensing system where the 
burden would be on the applicant for a tape recorder to show that it 
would not be used to dupe off(record)records' •••• 18 
An article entitled "Can You Sell Off-the-Air Recordings? " in a 
magazine published for tape recording enthusiasts reached the following 
conclusions: 
Naturally, no one is going to stop you from sitting in the privacy 
of your home and taking recordings off the air. There's nothing 
illegal about that just as there's nothing wrong with taking pictures 
of a program on your television screen. But, the use you make of 
the recording is another story. The courts have held squarely that 
a program is valuable property and that when you sell a recording 
taken off the air you are appropriating and exploiting for your own 
benefit the result of the expenditures, labor and skill of another •••• 19 
The author goes on to report the results of several cases dealing with 
home recording20 and draws comparisons with activities which are similar. 
For example, he points out that the Supreme Court has held that a news 
service cannot copy news from bulletins put out by a rival agency. It has 
18washington Daily News, February 21, 1956, p. 37. 
19George Chernoff, "Can You Sell Off-The-Air Recordings?" 
Tape Recording (May-June. 1956), 40-41. 
20Notably. the Metropolitan Opera case, which is the only case 
dealing directly with a home recordist. 
also been held that motion pictures of sports events made by spectators 
cannot fairly be placed on sale.21 
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A similar comparison could be drawn for television, where the legal 
problems are even more complex than those which concern home recording of 
music. Until recently there was much speculation over the introduction 
of videotape. The Copyright Act exempts records "or other sound recording" 
from copyright, yet it permits motion pictures to be copyrighted. The 
Copyright Office has settled the question by interpreting videotape as a 
medium which produces a visual, rather than an audible, product, and is 
now accepting videotapes for copyright. 22 
It should be pointed out to home recordists, although no publication 
has yet done so, that taping a dramatic show on television or radio may 
be unlawful even if it is not later presented in public for profit. The 
law states that the copyright owner of a dramatic work shall have exclusive 
rights: 
To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a 
drama or, if it be a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for 
sale, to vend any manuscript or any record whatsoever thereof; to 
make or to procure the making of any transcription or record thereof 
by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by 
any method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or re-
produced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce 
it in any manner or by any method whatsoever •••• 23 
The law leaves little to be presumed. If the drama has never been 
published, or copyrighted, the rights are equally conclusive. Since pre-
sentation on television does not constitute publication, common-law rights 
21George Chernoff, "Can You Sell Off-the-Air Recordings?", 
~• ~•, P• 40 
22The first videotape was accepted for copyright in April, 1961. 
2311 u.s.c. ll(d). 
are not compromised in an uncopyrighted work. Either way. a drama is 
protected even from the act of recording. regardless of the use made of 
the tape. 
In view of this fact it is difficult to comprehend the legal logic 
behind a headline in Tape Recording Magazine's account of the unveiling 
of RCA Videotape at Princeton. New Jersey. Reporting General Sarnoff's 
comments on future uses of videotape. the headline read: "Sarnoff looks 
forward to home taping of favorite TV shows."24 
RCA. more than any other manufacturer. has long advocated home 
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taping of broadcast material. Instruction sheets have been packed with 
RCA record players and tape recorders to guide purchasers in proper methods 
of taping discs and radio programs. and television commercials have 
glorified such activities as an advertising lure. 
This latter practice. however. soon was curtailed. When queried by 
telephone in 1956. Harry Olsson. NBC attorney. said NBC had stopped 
accepting commercials "urging the use of tape recorders to record off the 
air. on any NBC outlet. " Olsson did not. however. say the commercials 
could not be seen on other networks. or in other forms of advertising. 
Olsson said RCA not only did not have a policy on home recording 
but "did not want to have to make a public policy. for obvious reasons." 
He cited as a reason for a policy in opposition to home recording the 
lack of control over the recording after it passes into second and third 
hands. A recording could turn up in an estate. for example. and. lacking 
background information on how it was made. be used illegally. But he 
agreed that policing such a policy would be virtually impossible. 25 
2411rv Pictures on Tape. 11 Tape Recording. (February; 1964) • 22. 
26rnterview by telephone. April 26. 1956. 
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.Another writer has the following to say about home recording: 
In recording television, radio or other public entertainment, you 
may not legally reproduce or distribute your recording for commercial 
gain. This means that you may record unusual TV and radio performances, 
or copy your phonograph records onto tape, provided this is for your 
personal use. And your personal use will include lending your tapes 
to personal friends. A wider circulation, however -- such as lending 
a tape to the local school to be used for a charity bazaar -- is not 
legal and may cause trouble.26 
Although he argues from a valid premise, this writer does not go far 
enough into the subject to be truly helpful to an amateur recordist. 
Furthermore, his advice on distribution is precarious, at best. Until the 
courts have established a firm meaning for the term "distribution" it will 
be uncertain how far a recordist can go in spreading his pirated recordings 
around his neighborhood. 
A fairly searching study of the problem was made by Roger Needham, 
previously quoted, in which he stated: 
That the practice of taping off the air is conunon cannot be doubted. 
At least two firms engaged in producing 'hi-fi' components offer 
free pamphlets entitled 'Tape it Off the Air.' 
There is no American authority directly in point on this subject. 
The Germ.an case of GEMA v. Grundig G.m.b.H. involved a suit by the 
German counterpart of ASCAP against a manufacturer of recording 
machines. Plaintiffs sought to require defendant to obligate 
purchasers of his recorders to refrain from taping copyrighted music 
from the air. Perhaps because of practical difficulties, the court 
merely required defendant to give notice to purchasers that they 
would violate the copyright law if they recorded copyrighted music. 27 
Apparently the practical difficulties of enforcing a licensing system 
prevented the court from taking more than a precautionary outlook on problems 
raised by home recordists. No doubt the same difficulty has prevented a 
case on the same subject from reaching an American court. 
26r..ee Sheridan, "Tape Recording and the Law", Tape Recorders 
and Stereo, (1958), 110-111. 
27 Roger Needham., "Tape Recording, Photocopying and Fair Use, 11 
Copyright Law Symposium Number Ten (New York: Columbia University Press., 
1959), PP• 100-101. 
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The alternative for definitive solution -- legislation -- may offer 
more promise. But it is not likely that much legislation will appear 
before the general revision, now under consideration, is offered for a 
vote. Attempts at piecemeal solutions have been largely unsuccessful. 
The jukebox exemption has been on the chopping block in the House and 
Senate Judicial Subcommittees for the past twenty-two years, but it still 
remains a valid part of the Copyright Act. 
Part of the reason for failure has been the way the bills have been 
worded. In 1959, when the last attempt to am.end the Act was made, 
Representative Caller's wordy bill began: 
The reproduction or rendition of a copyrighted musical composition 
publicly by or upon a coin-operated machine shall be deemed to be 
a public performance for profit, and the operator of any such machine 
shall be liable for any infringement of any such musical composition 
occurring through the use of such machine, etc. etc.28 
Most legislative and copyright authorities prefer the much simpler 
"negative approach," in which the paragraph covering the exemption is 
striken from the Act. 
The 1969 hearings turned up considerable testimony with regard to 
record counterfeiting in the jukebox business, and underlined the lack 
of damages sufficient to justify legal countermeasures by ASCAP, BMI and 
SESAC attorneys. In 1961 a bill, also initiated by Representative Cellar, 
was presented which would make record counterfeiting a criminal offense 
29 and provide substantial damages for pirating. 
A revision of the Copyright Act would solve many dilemmas posed by 
the 1909 statute's lack of appreciation for advancing technology. Television, 
28 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 6921, 
To Require Jukebox Operators to Pay Royalty Fees,~• oit., p. l. 
29congressman Cellar's bill was introduced on April 17, 1961. 
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for example, presents a new realm of legislative problems . Some authorities 
have advocated a parti al revision of the Act to provide speci fically for 
televisi on, although it i s generally conceded that a revision of the Act 
woul d do a better job. A major difficulty, however, i s the length of time 
requi red for a r evision to be proposed and enacted. With our present 
civiliiation being as complicated as it is, the committee hearings on 
revision could drag on considerably, postponing agreement on revisi on for 
many years. 
The matter of recording for fun should be consi dered in some detail i n 
any future revision of the Copyright Act. The report which accompanied 
the hearings on the present Act stated the purpose of copyright legislati on 
i n this manners 
Not that any particular class of citizens, however worthy, may benef i t, 
but because the policy is believed to be for the benefit of the great 
body of people, in that it will stimulate writin§ and invention to 
give some bonus to authors and inventors •••• 3 
If present lawmakers are to take the present state-of-the-art as a 
guide they are not likely to legislate very many restri ctions on home 
recording. For if the skyrocketing rise in publi c demand for music at 
home over the past decade is any barometer, the "great body of people" in-
disputably relishes the privilege of listening, and many of them the 
satisfaction of recording, at home. 
3<\r .s. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 6921, 
To Require Jukebox Operators to Pay Royalty Fees,~•~•• P• 198. 
CHAPTER VI 
A Guide for the Future 
It is evident from the foregoing that technological progress has 
created a wealth of problems in the realm of copyright and music. From 
the steadily increasing~ of progress over the past several decades it 
is equally evident that existing problems will not diminish; rather, they 
are likely to increase with rapidity as technology places more and more 
electronic devices for entertainment in the hands of the American public. 
The problem, therefore, becomes one of either adapting society to the 
antique provisions of a 52-year-old statute, or of adapting the statute 
to meet the demands of modern-day society. 
It is to the first alternative that the bulk of this paper has been 
dedicated. Despite admonishments from ASCAP, the American Federation of 
Musicians and other artist or manufacturing interests to the contrary, 
it has been pointed out here that present l aw could be interpreted as 
condoning non-commercial use of copyrighted music, so long as the element 
of profit was totally absent. For the legal key to non-commercial, or 
simply "private", enjoyment of music is the existence or lack of profit. 
It must be emphasized, however, that the courts have not clearly 
stated this fact as dictum. The reasoning is purely the author's. To 
date, there has never been a case before the courts in the United States 
where the issue was private use of recording music. If such a case ever 
should arise, the author feels certain it would be settled in favor of 
the private recordist, if the "public performance for profit" doctrine 
were applied strictly. 
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But what of the future? Mention has been made of impending changes 
in the Copyright Act. Is it possible that this might serve as the 
opportunity to update the law and provide for solution of a number of in-
equities presently existing? 
This certainly could -- and probably will -- be done. But exactly 
how the question of home recordists, and many other problems raised by 
modern teclmology, will be solved is difficult to determine. A few 
suggestions, however, may be in order as a guide to copyright planners 
when the task of revision is undertaken. 
Of paramount importance is a change in .the law to permit records to 
be registered, not as a "copy", if the philosophy which says that "copies 
must be seen and not heard" is to prevail, but as a "copy of a copy", or 
"registered facsimile." The law might state that whereas disc (or tape) 
records are not themselves copyrighted, they represent a bona fide repro-
duction of the original and are to be considered in the same light as a 
book which is a bona fide reproduction of an author's original typescript. 
To effect such a change would require a reversal of the Apollo case 
by the Supreme Court, but it would appear that enough evidence has accumu-
lated in recent years of devices which supercede the pianola rolls which 
were in vogue in 1908 when the Apollo case first was heard on which to 
base a reversal. 
This move could be followed by a provision for fines and imprisonment 
for record counterfeiting, sufficiently severe that record pirates would 
think twice before dubbing a record. 
These two moves would serve to eliminate one of the chief problems 
affecting the record industry, and would go a long way toward eliminating 
the confusion over disc copyrighting which has resulted in a dual system 
of copyright protection: one for films and another for discs. 
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The "jukebox exemption" should be abolished. Again, conditions today 
make reliance on a 1909 teclmicality somewhat ridiculous. It can be under-
stood that small-time jukebox operators would have a difficult time if they 
were forced to pay an additional yearly fee to ASC.AP. But they would not 
be the first group of small businessmen forced to adapt to modern conditions 
and required to spend money in order to keep their business morally and 
ethically sound. 
The separation of various forms of copyright in the Act should be 
eliminated, so far as is practically possible. All forms 01' artistic 
matter should be treated equally. Too often, in legislative composition, 
it has been the practice to enumerate specifics in order to appease special 
interest groups without regard for t he consequences of evolution . In the 
case of music, the lack of foresight shown in 1909 by failure to allocate 
the general drunage provisions for musical infringement is a case in point. 
Damages which are provided for musi cal copyright i nfringement are insigni-
ficant. This division of damages should be eliminated in the new copyright 
bill. 
The "compulsory provisions" of the Act should be eliminated. There 
is no reason for a composer to be required to permit unlicensed recording 
of his music simply because he has once permitted someone else to make a 
recording of it. The practical matter of financing notwithstanding, the 
principle is one whi ch is not equitable, and it should be eliminated. 
Although it could be argued that under the present law "public per-
formance for profit" serves to protect the private recordist from 
prosecution. not all authorities subscribe to this principle. and the new 
law should make allowance for private recording and otherwise non-commercial 
use of recorded music. I t is significant to note that every proposed 
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copyright revi sion since 1909 has advocat ed, sometimes in elabor ate t erms, 
that use of copyrighted music by private persons shoul d be exempt from 
liabil ity. Such a statement would well end confusion over the l egal role 
played by t he home recordist. 
A paragraph designed to protect the amateur from act ion for infringe-
ment mi ght be wor ded as follows: 
Nothing in the foregoing shall be construed as intending to prevent 
non-connn.ercial use of copyrighted music by private individuals 
whose sole concern is pleasure and esthetic satisfaction. 
This paragraph could be inserted at the end of Section l(e), in place 
of the present jukebox exemption paragraph. 
Another paragraph should free from liability finns engaged in demon-
strating and selling audio equipment to the public. How audio supply 
houses could be separated from barber shops (insofar as both use radios 
to entertain customers) might prove difficult, but a solution would help 
end confusion arising from the fact t hat although such stores are certainly 
liable under present law they are not sued by ASCAP simply because of the 
society's "good will." 
To this author it appears relatively insignificant whether broadcast 
music constitutes a "public performance" inasmuch as the question of profit 
protects the home recordist who does not sell recordings and separates 
him from hotels and other businesses which use broadcast music commercially. 
Nevertheless, the matter of "liability at the source" so vi t al to ASCAP 
might well be resolved by incorporating in the new Copyright Act a para-
graph specifically freeing listener/users of broadcast music from liability, 
so long as the music is not used for profit. 
It might be argued that such a provision would be redundant, inasmuch 
as the "public performance for profit" doctrine remains in effect. This 
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opinion is shared by this author, but so much litigation has ensued 
because of confusion over this point that a paragraph settling the question 
once and for all might well be in order. 
On the question of publication, and its vital effect on cessation of 
common-law rights, the law should provide for publication of phonograph 
records concurrent with their release and distribution. This could be 
done in the same paragraph which provides for "registration" of phonograph 
records as "copies of copies." Although the fact probably would be under-
stood, it might also be provided that unregistered records which are distributed 
automatically lose their claim to copyright, and would be declared in the 
public domain. 
The matter of common-law rights, and the very dubious position 
individuals hold in the various states with respect to rights in music, 
could not be settled in the new statute, but the solution of the fore-
going problems by statute certainly would tend to mitigate them. Most 
important, legislative provision for new forms of technology, new con-
cepts and new means for expression would end the mass of confusion which 
has been building for the past 52 years by determining, for the guidance 
of the courts, the degrees to which composers and users are entitled to 
share the product which they both cherish -- the music. It would also 
end the growing tendency of the courts to settle everything by common 
law if there is any particle of doubt. 
The Constitution did not intend for authors and composers t o have 
perpetual rights in their compositions. Nor did it intend (in this 
writer's opinion) for individuals either singly or collectively as 
businesses to have perpetual rights in their performances or in the 
products they create. The oonoept of rights "for a limited time only" 
has been developing for 300 years. It does not appear to this writer 
that the concept is so fragile that the courts should abolish it simply 
because there is no statutory hammer with which to nail a decision. 
A new, revised Copyright Act would restore the concept of "limited 
rights" the way it was originally intended, and would adapt it to the 
fluid conditions of a twentieth-century society. 
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